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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the decision of the 
District Court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On June 10, 1972, Defendants signed a Promissory 
Note and Security Agreement with Plaintiff in the amount of 
$4,527.38. Defendants pledged various exempt household 
goods as security for the loan including a refrigerator, 
electric range, washer, dinette set, and the family's beds. 
No explanation of the exemption laws of the State of Utah 
was given by any of the employees of Plaintiff nor were 
Defendants aware of such laws. Defendants subsequently 
defaulted and Plaintiff sought to foreclose the security 
interest. Defendant Mary Espinoza raised the issue of 
unconscionability under U.C.A. §70B-5-108 with regard to the 
taking of a security interest in exempt property and trial 
on this issue W"l.S held on July 20, 1979, before the Honorable 
Ronald O. Hyde. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE GRANTHJG OF A SECURITY INTEREST IN 
STATUTORILY EXEMPT PROPERTY IS A WAIVER 
OF A RIGHT AND AS SUCH MUST BE KNOWINGLY 
AND INTENTIONALLY MADE. 
-2-
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As security for the loan involved here Defendants 
pledged the following items of property: refrigerator, 
electric range, washing machine, dinette set with chairs, 
couch, recliner, rocker, stereo, television, two rugs, bunk 
beds, two chests of drawers, bedroom set, rifle, tent, 
sewing machine, two end tables, ceramic lamp, a 1967 pickup 
truck with camper shell and a 1964 Chevrolet station wagon. 
Most, if not all of the household goods would fall within 
the meaning of U.C.A. §78-23-1: 
The following property is exempt from execution 
except as herein otherwise specially provided, 
and except as provided in the Utah Uniform 
Concumer Credit Code relating to certain consumer 
transactions: 
(1) Chairs, tables, and desks ... ; 
(2) Necessary household, table and kitchen 
furniture belonging to the judgment debtor .•.. 
This Court has held that a valid security interest 
may be created in exe~pt property. Clearfield State Bank 
v. Contos, 562 P.2d 622 (Utah 1977). 
It matters not that the property may be 
subject of such an exemption [Under U.C.A. 
§78-23-1) .... The owner thereof may never-
theless sell or alienate his property of 
that nature, or any interest that he may 
have therein. 
The Contos holding is consistent with the general 
rule that a debtor may pledge exempt property, thereby 
waiving the exemption. The mortgaging of the property is 
-3-
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considered an implied waiver. See 69 Am. Jur. 2d Secured 
Transactions §562; 31 Am. Jur. 2d Exemptions §159. 
However, in order for a waiver, express or implied, 
to be valid, it must be a "voluntary and intentional relin-
quishment of a known legal right." Schwab Safe & Lock co. 
v. Snow, 47 Utah 199, 152 P. 171, 176 (1915). That case 
involved a waiver in a contract setting. This definition 
was reaffirmed in O'Donnell v. Parker, 48 Utah 578, 160 P. 
1192 (1916) (waiving statute of limitations) and in Wooley 
v. Loose, 57 Utah 336, 194 P. 908 (1920) (waiving statute of 
frauds). 
The present Utah law concerning waiver is stated 
in Phoenix Insurance Co. v. Heath, 90 Utah 187, 61 P.2d 
308, 311-2 (1936). "A waiver is the intentional relinquish-
ment of a known right. To constitute a waiver, there must 
be an existing right, benefit, or advantage, a knowledge of 
its existence, and an intention to relinquish it. It must 
be distinctly made, although it may be express or implied." 
(insurance context). This analysis was followed in American 
Savings & Loan Association v. Blomquist, 21 Utah 2d 289, 445 
P.2d 1, 3 (1968) (mortgagee's right to accelerate debt); 
Bjork'!....:.._ April Industries, Inc., 547 P.2d 219, 220 (Utah 
1976) (right to have shares registered). 
-4-
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No waiver was found by this court in any of these 
cases. This analysis is consistent with decisions of the 
United States Supreme Court on the question of waiver in 
other contexts. That court has also repeatedly held that a 
waiver is an intentional relinquishment of a known right. 
See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1937) (right to 
counsel) and Ohio Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Utilities 
Comm., 301 U.S. 292, 306-7 (1937) (right to appropriate 
valuation of utility property). 
In the present context this court should likewise 
hold that no waiver of rights has occured since the Defendants 
were never informed of their exemption rights and thus could 
not have knowi· 1gly waived them. This Court should follow 
the analysis recently utilized by courts in Louisiana and 
Pennsylvania in dealing with very similar fact situations. 
In Aetna Finance Company v. Antoine , 343 So.2d 
1195 (La. App. 1977), the court held that debtors who had 
executed a chattel mortgage on household furnishings had 
thereby granted an implied waiver of their right to assert 
the relevant statutory exemptions. But the court went on to 
hold that the debtors were not foreclosed from attacking the 
validity of the waiver on the grounds that the waiver of the 
exemption had not been knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently 
made. After discussing the policy issues involved the court 
stated: 
-5-
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Notwithstanding the fact that a person 
executing a chattel mortgage knew, pre-
sumably, that he was in fact granting a 
chattel mortgage on the movable property, 
he is not presumed to know the effect of 
a chattel mortgage on the exemption. 
Accordingly, we hold that the irrebuttable 
presumption does not exist, and a debtor is 
not foreclosed from attacking the validity 
of the waiver under circumstances where 
the debtor shows the waiver was not knowingly, 
voluntarily and intelligently made. 
Id. at 1198. (Emphasis added) 
This conclusion was reached after an analysis by 
the court that to consider the signing of the note as an 
irrebuttable presumption of waiver 
would result in a foreclosure ... of the 
right of a debtor to attack the validity 
of a waiver under circumstances, where 
for one of many reasons, a debtor is not 
aware of the effect of the chattel 
mortgage on the exemption. Id. 
The Louisiana court echoes the past decisions of this court 
in indicating its reluctance to find a waiver except in 
"exceptional cases." 
Similarly, in Transnational Consumer Discount 
Company v. Kefauver, 307 A.2d 303 (Pa. Super. 1973), the 
debtors had signed a judgment note and security agreement 
which stated that the signers "waive all relief from all 
appraisement and exemption laws of any State now in force or 
hereafter to be passed". Upon default and judgment the 
Sheriff levied upon household goods covered by the security 
-G-
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agreement. The lower court accepted the debtor's testimony 
that they did not know they had an exemption to waive but 
nevertheless found the waiver valid relying on older Pennsyl-
vania case law. The lower court stated: 
The waiver is here stated on the face of 
the note and in standard type and was not 
buried in fine print .... It is clear from 
the deposition of the parties that defendants 
had an ample opportunity to read the loan 
documents and that the plaintiff was not 
guilty of any misconduct or misrepresentation. 
Defendants were in general aware of the terms 
of their loan and recognized that their fur-
niture could be taken in the event of their 
default.... Id. at 304. 
The Superior Court of Pennsylvania overturned the 
lower court's decision and overruled the older case law, 
stating that no waiver may be found unless it is also found 
that the debtor has voluntarily relinquished a right he 
knows he has. "Since in the present case the lower court 
found that appellants did not know of their right to the 
$300 exemption, the court should have found no waiver of 
that right and so should have granted the petition to stay 
execution." Id. at 305. The court relied in part on Swarb 
v. Lennox, 314 F. Supp. 1091 (E.D. Pa. 1970) which had dealt 
with the validity of confessions of judgment contained in 
contracts or leases. There the court found that there had 
not been an intentional waiver as the debtors did not fully 
understand the rights which they were relinquishing by 
signing the notes. 
-7-
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The Kefauver court also held that the fact that 
the right waived was statutory rather than constitutional 
was immaterial and that knowledge of the right was required 
for a valid waiver thereof. 
In the present case the evidence is undisputed 
that Plaintiff never explained the exemption laws of Utah to 
Defendants. See Plaintiff's Answers to First Set of In-
terrogatories P.6. Nowhere on the face of either the 
Security Agreement or the Disclosure Form which Plaintiff 
provided and which Defendants signed is there any mention of 
Defendant's statutory exemption rights. Clearly Defendants 
did not make a knowing waiver of their rights, thus no 
waiver exists and Defendants should be allowed to claim 
their statutory exemption. 
POINT II 
TAKING A NONPURCHASE-MONEY SECURITY 
INTEREST IN EXEMPT HOUSEHOLD FURNISH-
INGS WITHOUT DISCLOSING EXEMPTION 
RIGHTS IS UNCONSCIONABLE UNDER U.C.A. 
§70B-5-108. 
This Court's equitable jurisdiction is invoked in 
this appeal both through constitutional directive and through 
Defendant's claim of unconscionability under U.C.A. §70B-5-iOo 
See Powell v. Bastian, 541 P. 2d 1127, 1132 (Utah 1975) (Maughan, 
-8-
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QB. 
an, 
J. dissenting). The concept of unconscionability is im-
precise and is always subject to the specific facts of a 
given case. Courts have, however, indicated certain factors 
which may be indicators of an unconscionable contract: the 
denial of basic rights and remedies to a buyer of consumer 
goods, the inclusion of penalty clauses, the circumstances 
surrounding the execution of the contract, an imbalance in 
the obligations and rights imposed by the bargain, exploita-
tion of the underprivileged, unsophisticated, uneducated and 
illiterate, and inequality of bargaining or economic power. 
See Willie v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Company, 549 P.2d 
903, 907 (Kan. 1976). 
The taking of nonpurchase-money security interests 
in exempt household goods has been widely condemned as 
against public policy and unconscionable. Two recent federal 
actions and a variety of state responses to the problem 
indicate the seriousness and possible remedies. The Federal 
Trade Commission recently released its Presiding Officer's 
Report on Proposed Trade Regulation Rule: Credit Practices 
(16 C.F.R. Part 444) Public Record No. 215-42, Issued August 
1978 (hereinafter Report) . The FTC considered various 
credit practices for over three years and heard testimony 
from various persons representing all aspects of the credit 
industry as well as consumers. The Report reached the 
following conclusions: 
-9-
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a. Security interests in household goods 
[2 (a) (4)]. Section 2 (a) (4) of the proposed 
rule is intended to prevent the taking of a 
non-purchase money blanket security interest 
in all of the household goods of a debtor to 
secure payment of either a personal loan or 
the purchase price of consumer goods or services 
it can be stated categorically that such pro-
visions are used in a majority of consumer 
credit contracts of finance companies and in 
many of the contracts of retailers, banks, and 
credit unions. 
Although the taking of non-purchase money 
security interests in household goods is 
commonplace in almost every state where 
such a security interest is permitted, and 
it _s permitted in virtually all of the 
states, actual repossession of household 
goods following a default is a relatively 
infrequent occurrence .... 
The relatively low rate of repossessions 
supports a finding that the primary purpose 
or creditor benefit in taking security 
interests in household goods is the utility 
of this form of collateral in impressing 
upon the consumer the necessity for making 
timely payments on the obligation and to 
provide the creditor with an effective means 
of curing defaults. 
The record supports a finding that security 
interests in household goods are susceptible 
to misuse and abuse by creditors to obtain 
payment from debtors who are actually in no 
position, regardless of the cause, to make 
those payments. There is no doubt that in 
terrorem use of the remedy in the form of 
threats to repossess can and does result 
in emotional suffering, humiliation, anxiety, 
leading in extreme cases to mental and physical 
breakdowns, and considerable harm to the family 
relationships. 
At least with respect to low-income con-
sumers the record shows that household goods, 
as a whole, have little actual market value; 
-10-
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and this value is not a significant considera-
tion in determining whether or not to grant a 
loan or in determining the amount of the loan. 
It is probably more likely that the loan will 
be under-secured than that the value of the 
household goods will exceed the amount of the 
loan. Creditors, as a group, are far more 
interested in being repaid than in obtaining a 
right to seize the property. To a consumer 
the sentimental psychological value of the 
household goods exceeds the actual cash value. 
However, most consumers recognize that the 
replacement cost of this type of property is 
far greater than the amount owed on the secured 
loan. For all of these reasons low-income 
consumers are most anxious to avoid reposses-
sion and are peculiarly vulnerable to threats 
of repossession. In the face of such threats 
they may well fail to assert valid or meri-
torious defenses. 
The evidence, at least as far as the 
low-income or poor consumer is concerned, 
supports a finding and the accompanying con-
clusion that a grant of a non-purchase money 
security interest in household goods has the 
potential and will, in many cases, result in 
injury far greater than any benefits to be 
gained through the use of the credit thereby 
obtained .... (Emphasis added) pp. 160-162. 
The FTC rule would greatly restrict the taking of nonpurchase-
money security interests in household goods due to the 
severe repercussions caused to the family by later attempts 
to repossess the property. 
In response to the same problem, Congress recently 
enacted a greatly revised Bankruptcy Act, P.L. 95-598, 
Approved November 6, 1978. 11 U.S.C. §522(e) and (f) state 
-11-
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that a waiver of exemptions in favor of a creditor on an 
unsecured claim involving exempt property is unenforceable 
and that a debtor may avoid any lien granted as a nonpos-
sessory, nonpurchase-money security interest in household 
goods which impairs the debtor's exemption rights to those 
goods. That Congress recognized the specific practice under 
consideration here as unconscionable is clear from the 
legislative history of the new act: 
The second right [to avoid security 
interests] will be of more significance 
for the average consumer debtor. Fre-
quently, creditors lending money to a 
consumer debtor take a security interest 
in all of the debtor's belongings, and 
obtain a waiver by the debtor of his exem-
ptions. In most of these cases, the debtor 
is unaware of the consequences of the forms 
he signs. The creditor's experience pro-
vides him with a substantial advantage. If 
the debtor encounters financial difficulty, 
creditors often use threats of repossession 
of all of the debtor's household goods as a 
means of obtaining payment. 
In fact, were the creditor to carry 
through on his threat and foreclose on the 
property, he would receive little, for 
household goods have little resale value. 
They are far QOre valuable to the creditor 
in the debtor's hands, for they provide a 
credible basis for the threat, because the 
replacement costs of the goods are generally 
high. Thus, creditors rarely repossess, and 
debtors, ignorant of the creditors' true 
intentions, are coerced into payments they 
simply cannot afford to make. 
The exemption provision allows the debtor, 
after bankruptcy has been filed, and creditor 
collection techniques have been stayed, to 
-12-
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undu the consequences of a contract of adhesion 
signed in ignorance, by permitting the invalida~ 
tion of nonpurchase money security interests 
in household goods. Such security interests 
have.too often been used by over-reaching 
creditors. The bill eliminates any unfair 
advantage creditors have. 
H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, 95th Cong. 2nd Sess. 
127. 
At least four states have legislatively reached 
the same conclusion and expressly invalidate waivers of the 
exemption of household goods. See Vukowich, Debtors' 
Exemption Rights 62 Geo.L.J. 779 at 849 (1974). 
It has been argued that to invalidate any contractual 
agreement which may result in the loss of property necessary 
to survive is to restrict the freedom of the owners of that 
property. While this is true to some extent, public policy 
requires that some property be protected for debtors. One 
commentator suggests: 
... To accommodate these interests, permitting 
waivers of exemptions and security interests 
in the more substantial exempt assets-such 
as the homestead and insurance-is reasonable, 
but waivers and security interests which 
affect exempt property which provide immediate 
support and maintenance-such as wages, house-
hold goods, tools of the trade, and clothing-
should not be allowed .... The policy is sound, 
since it permits persons to use the more sub-
stantial assets as collateral; in fact, these 
are the types of assets which represent the 
best collateral and which are most commonly 
used as such. To some extent, the denial of 
the right to waive exemptions and grant 
security interests in other assets would in-
fringe upon persons' rights to obtain 
-13-
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credit. However, the infringement is not 
very great and the benefits of the policy 
of protection of the debtor and his family 
outweigh the losses occasioned by this in-
friP jement. Id at 852. 
The disparate bargaining position of the creditor 
here and the use of the security interest in household goods 
primarily as a threat to collect the debt can be seen from 
the Plaintiff's Answers to First Set of Interrogatories. 
The Credit Union admits that the indications of ability to 
repay that were requested all concerned Defendants' income 
and past payment history and no mention is made of the val~ 
of the goods taken as security. Furthermore, the total 
value of all the exempt household goods is listed by Plaintif'. 
at $791. 00 and the total value of all collateral is $2, 691.00 
to secure a note of $4,527.38. Clearly the loan could have 
been arranged without the exempt goods which contributed 
less than one-third of the total value of the security. A 
loan in some amount could have been arranged and the public 
policy of preventing total destitution would have been 
supported. As written in the agreement, after foreclosure 
this family will be unable to feed itself at home and all 
family members will have to sleep on bare floors since even 
the carpets will be sold. Public policy must not allow this 
result to take place. This is particularly true in the 
present context where there is no indication whatsoever that 
-14-
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DLlfcndants were aware of the consequences of their signing 
the security agreement - that the family had given up their 
legal rights to the minimum necessities of life. 
CONCLUSION 
It appears quite clear that no explanation of 
debtors' exemption rights was made in this case. Since the 
policy of most courts, including that of this court, is that 
a waiver of such rights may only be made knowingly and 
voluntarily, no valid waiver could have occurred here. In 
the alternative, this Court should find that the taking of 
a security interest in such exempt property is invalid as an 
unconscionable act under U.C.A. §70B-5-108 and not allow 
Plaintiff to foreclose their security interest in the 
exempt property, or in the alternative, set aside any 
balance due and owing on the note. ~ 
Respectful~y submitted this Z__ day of March, 1979. 
UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC. 
Attorneys for Defendant/ 
Appellant 
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